

PPD 715: Political Economy and Institutional Analysis

Fall 2018
Thursdays, 2 pm
RGL 304

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Office hours: Thursday 1-2 pm or by appointment

This seminar provides a general introduction to the field of American Political Institutions. It is structured as a “survey” course, providing both an overview of classic works and coverage of important new research in and across the major subfields of American Political Institutions. Given finite time and vast literatures, breadth will be emphasized over depth. This means that what we read is not the “final say” but just one part of a larger (and often ongoing) conversation in the literature. Students are encouraged to pursue course topics beyond the required reading; I have provided some recommended readings in this regard.

We will take a “political economy” approach to the study of American Political Institutions. Political economy can mean different things. In this course, we will follow the definition and description provided by Wittman and Weingast (2006): “political economy is the methodology of economics applied to the analysis of political behavior and institutions. As such, it is not a single, unified approach, but a family of approaches. Because institutions are no longer ignored, but instead are often the subject matter of the investigation, this approach incorporates many of the issues of concern to political sociologists. Because political behavior and institutions are themselves a subject of study, politics also becomes the subject of political economy. All of this is tied together by a set of methodologies, typically associated with economics, but now part and parcel of political science itself. The unit of analysis is typically the individual. The individual is motivated to achieve goals (usually preference maximization), the theory is based in mathematics (often game theoretic), and the empirics either use sophisticated statistical techniques or involve experiments.”¹

A political-economic approach is often also called “rational choice.” And when applied specifically to the study of institutions, it is sometimes called “the new institutionalism.”

The primary goal of this course is to develop a working knowledge of the important literatures and debates. This will provide a solid foundation for additional graduate work as well as assist in preparation for independent research. A secondary goal of this course is to introduce students to social science as a profession. We will discuss the professional norms, expectations, and future directions of the political science and political economy fields.

¹ Weingast, Barry R., and Donald A. Wittman. 2006. “The Reach of Political Economy.” In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*, eds., Barry R. Weingast and Donald A. Wittman. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pages 3-4.

Course Requirements

There are several requirements for this class:

(1) You must come to class prepared, which means that you have done *all* of the week's readings in advance. You are also expected to participate in class discussion. Participation is what makes a seminar a useful learning experience – you learn as much from the in-class discussion as you do from the readings themselves. Moreover, given that this is your chosen vocation, you should take an active role in fostering your professional development.

(2) My role each week will be that of a moderator, providing background context and steering the discussion in various directions. I won't identify weekly "discussion leaders." Rather, each student must contribute to in-class discussion and should expect to be called on for input.

(3) The course grade will be a function of three short essays (15%), class participation (50%), and a take-home final exam or final paper (35%). The goal of the essays will be to analyze and critique a given week's readings individually or collectively. Each essay will be due *before* the class meets to discuss that particular week's readings. Finally, the timing and specifics for the final exam or final paper option will be discussed in class.

Course Materials

The readings for the course will be a balance between books and journal articles. Most of the journal articles are available electronically, usually at JSTOR and sometimes at the journal's webpage. For those articles (or book chapters) that are not available electronically, I will provide electronic copies, which will be sent to you roughly a week before such readings are covered in class.

- Required reading will be marked with a *.
- Recommended or supplemental reading will be marked with a #.

We will be reading most or all of 10 books:

- Aldrich, John H. 2011. *Why Parties?: A Second Look*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Anzia, Sarah. 2014. *Timing and Turnout: How Off-Cycle Elections Favor Organized Groups*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2005. *Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Epstein, David, and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1999. *Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Howell, William H. 2003. *Power without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Krehbiel, Keith. 1998. *Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

- Kriner, Douglas L., and Andrew Reeves. 2015. *The Particularistic President: Executive Branch Politics and Political Inequality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lewis, David E. 2008. *The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and Bureaucratic Performance*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Mayhew, David R. 2004. *Congress: The Electoral Connection*, Second Edition. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Mayhew, David R. 2005. *Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations, 1946-2002*, Second Edition. New Haven: Yale University Press.

These books are recommended if you are especially interested in a particular week's topic:

- Binder, Sarah A. 2003. *Stalemate: Causes and Consequences of Legislative Gridlock*. Washington: Brookings Institution Press.
- Gailmard, Sean, and John W. Patty. 2013. *Learning While Governing: Expertise and Accountability in the Executive Branch*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- McCann, Pamela J. Clouser. 2016. *The Federal Design Dilemma: Congress and Intergovernmental Delegation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

In addition, the following book is recommended for a basic introduction to rational choice and the new institutionalism:

- Shepsle, Kenneth. 2010. *Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions*, Second Edition. New York: Norton.

Below is a week-by-week list of required reading assignments:

Week 1 (August 23): Course Overview and Discussion of the Syllabus

Week 2 (August 30): Studying Institutions (No Class)

*Shepsle, Kenneth A. 1989. "Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 1(2): 131-47. (JSTOR)

*Weingast, Barry R. 1996. "Political Institutions: Rational Choice Perspectives." In *A New Handbook of Political Science*.
<http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0198294719.001.0001/acprof-9780198294719-chapter-5?print=pdf>

*Smith, Steven S. et al. 2013. "Introduction to the Spatial Theory of Legislating" in *The American Congress*. (pp. 405-416)

#Diermeier, Daniel, and Keith Krehbiel. 2003. "Institutionalism as a Methodology." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 15(2): 123-44. (JSTOR)

Week 3 (September 6): Congress: The Electoral Connection

- *Mayhew, David R. 2004. *Congress: The Electoral Connection*, Second Edition. All.
- *Rothenberg, Lawrence S., and Mitchell S. Sanders. 2000. "Severing the Electoral Connection: Shirking in the Contemporary Congress." *American Journal of Political Science* 44: 316-25. (JSTOR)
- *Aldrich, John H., and David W. Rohde. 2001. "The Logic of Conditional Party Government: Revisiting the Electoral Connection." In Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds., *Congress Reconsidered*, Seventh Edition. Washington: CQ Press.
- #Jenkins, Jeffery A., and Timothy P. Nokken. 2008. "Partisanship, the Electoral Connection, and Lame-Duck Sessions of Congress, 1877-2006." 2008. *Journal of Politics* 70(2): 450-65.
- #Kastellec, Jonathan P., Jeffrey R. Lax, Michael Malecki, and Justin H. Phillips. 2015. "Polarizing the Electoral Connection: Partisan Representation in Supreme Court Confirmation Politics." *Journal of Politics* 77(3): 787-804.

Week 4 (September 13): Political Parties

- *Aldrich, John H. 2011. *Why Parties?* Chapters 1-2, 6-9.
- *Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2005. *Setting the Agenda*. Chapters 1-6.
- *Bawn, Kathleen, et al. 2012. "A Theory of Political Parties: Groups, Policy Demands and Nominations in American Politics." *Perspectives on Politics* 10: 571-97. (JSTOR)
- #Jenkins, Jeffery A., and Nathan W. Monroe. 2012. "Buying Negative Agenda Control in the U.S. House." *American Journal of Political Science* 56(4): 897-912.
- #McCarty, Nolan, and Eric Schickler. 2018. "On the Theory of Parties." *Annual Review of Political Science* 21: 175-93. (ARPS website)

Week 5 (September 20): Presidency I

- *Kriner, Douglas L., and Andrew Reeves. 2015. *The Particularistic President*. All
- *Berry, Christopher R., Barry C. Burden, and William G. Howell. 2010. "The President and the Distribution of Federal Spending." *American Political Science Review* 104(4): 783 – 799. (JSTOR)

- *Dynes, Adam, and Gregory A. Huber. 2015. "Partisanship and the Allocation of Federal Spending: Do Same-Party Legislators or Voters Benefit from Shared Party Affiliation with the President and House Majority?" *American Political Science Review* 109(1): 172-86. (JSTOR)
- #Rogowski, Jon C. 2016. "Presidential Influence in an Era of Congressional Dominance." *American Political Science Review* 110(2): 325-41. (APSR website)
- #Lowande, Kenneth S., Jeffery A. Jenkins, and Andrew J. Clarke. 2017. "Presidential Particularism and US Trade Politics." *Political Science Research and Methods* 6(2): 265-81. (PSRM website)

Week 6 (September 27): Lawmaking I

- *Mayhew, David R. 2005. *Divided We Govern*, Second Edition. All.
- *Binder, Sarah A. 1999. "The Dynamic of Legislative Gridlock, 1947-96." *American Political Science Review* 93(3): 519-33. (JSTOR)
- *Binder, Sarah A. 2014. "Polarized We Govern?" Center for Effective Public Management at Brookings. https://www.amazon.com/Segregation-Design-Politics-Inequality-American/dp/1108454984/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1535050942&sr=1-1&keywords=trounstine%2C+jessica
- *Kriner, Douglas L., and Eric Schickler. 2014. "Investigating the President: Committee Probes and Presidential Approval, 1953-2006." *Journal of Politics* 76(2): 521-34. (JSTOR)
- #Binder, Sarah A. 2003. *Stalemate*. All.

Week 7 (October 4): Lawmaking II

- *Krehbiel, Keith. 1998. *Pivotal Politics*. All.
- *Wawro, Gregory J., and Eric Schickler. 2004. "Where's the Pivot? Obstruction and Lawmaking in the Pre-Cloture Senate." *American Journal of Political Science* 48: 758-74. (JSTOR)
- *Gray, Thomas R., and Jeffery A. Jenkins. 2019. "Pivotal Politics and the Ideological Content of Landmark Laws." *Journal of Public Policy* 39(1): --. (JPP website)

#Madonna, Anthony J. 2011. "Winning Coalition Formation in the US Senate: The Effects of Legislative Decision Rules and Agenda Change." *American Journal of Political Science* 55(2): 276-288. (JSTOR)

#Krehbiel, Keith. 2018. "Pivotal Politics as Normal Science." *Journal of Politics* 80(3): 1100-15.

Week 8 (October 11): Presidency II

*Howell, William G. 2003. *Power without Persuasion*. All.

*Bolton, Alexander, and Sharece Thrower. 2016. "Legislative Capacity and Executive Unilateralism" *American Journal of Political Science* 60(3): 649-63. (AJPS website)

*Reeves, Andrew, and Jon C. Rogowski. 2018. "The Public Cost of Unilateral Action." *American Journal of Political Science* 62(2): 424-40. (AJPS website)

#Chiou-Fang-Yi, and Lawrence S. Rothenberg. 2014. "The Elusive Search for Presidential Power." *American Journal of Political Science* 58(3): 653-68. (JSTOR)

#Christenson, Dino P., and Douglas L. Kriner. 2017. "Mobilizing the Public Against the President: Congress and the Political Costs of Unilateral Action." *American Journal of Political Science* 61(4): 769-85. (AJPS website)

Week 9 (October 18): Presidency III

*Moe, Terry M. 1985. "The Politicized Presidency." In John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson, eds., *The New Direction in American Politics*. Washington: Brookings.

*Lewis, David E. 2008. *The Politics of Presidential Appointments*. All.

*Lowande, Kenneth. 2019. "Politicization and Responsiveness in Executive Agencies." *Journal of Politics* 81(1): --. (JOP webpage)

#Gordon, Sanford A. 2011. "Politicizing Agency Spending Authority: Lessons from a Bush-era Scandal." *American Political Science Review* 105(4): 717-34. (JSTOR)

#Wood, Abby K., and David E. Lewis. 2017. "Agency Performance Challenges and Agency Politicization." *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 27(4): 581-95. (JPART website)

Week 10 (October 25): Bureaucracy

- *McCubbins, Mathew D., and Thomas Schwartz. 1984. "Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms." *American Journal of Political Science* 28: 165-79. (JSTOR)
- *McCubbins, Mathew D., Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast. 1987. "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control," *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 3: 243-77. (JSTOR)
- *Canes-Wrone, Brandice. 2003. "Bureaucratic Decisions and the Composition of the Lower Courts." *American Journal of Political Science* 47: 205-14. (JSTOR).
- *Potter, Rachel Augustine. 2017. "Slow-Rolling, Fast-Tracking, and the Pace of Bureaucratic Decisions in Rulemaking." *Journal of Politics* 79(3): 841-55. (JOP webpage)
- *Acs, Alex. 2018. "Policing the Administrative State." *Journal of Politics* 80(4): --. (JOP webpage)
- #Gailmard, Sean, and John W. Patty. 2013. *Learning While Governing*. All.

Week 11 (November 1): Supreme Court

- *Segal, Jeffrey A., and Albert D. Cover. 1989. "Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices." *American Political Science Review* 83: 557-65. (JSTOR)
- *Clark, Tom S. 2009. "The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and Judicial Legitimacy." *American Journal of Political Science* 53: 971-89. (JSTOR)
- *Bailey, Michael A. and Forrest Maltzman. 2009. "Does Legal Doctrine Matter? Unpacking Law and Policy Preferences on the US Supreme Court." *American Political Science Review* 102(3): 369-84. (JSTOR)
- *Carruba, Cliff, Barry Friedman, Andrew D. Martin and Georg Vanberg. 2012. "Who Controls the Content of Supreme Court Opinions?" *American Journal of Political Science*. 56(2): 400-12. (JSTOR)
- *Hall, Matthew E.K. 2014. "The Semiconstrained Court: Public Opinion, the Separation of Powers, and the U.S. Supreme Court's Fear of Nonimplementation" *American Journal of Political Science* 53(2): 971-89. (JSTOR)

#Black, Ryan C., and Ryan J. Owens. 2009. "Agenda Setting in the Supreme Court: The Collision of Policy and Jurisprudence." *Journal of Politics* 71(3): 1062-1075. (JSTOR)

#Epstein, Lee, and Jack Knight. 2013. "Reconsidering Judicial Preferences." *Annual Review of Political Science* 16: 11-31. (ARPS webpage)

Week 12 (November 8): Delegation

*Epstein, David, and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1999. *Delegating Powers*. All.

*Huber, John D., Charles R. Shipan, and Madelaine Pfahler. 2001. "Legislatures and Statutory Control of Bureaucracy." *American Journal of Political Science* 45: 330-45. (JSTOR)

*McCann, Pamela J. Clouser. 2015. "The Strategic Use of Congressional Intergovernmental Delegation." *Journal of Politics* 77(3): 620-34. (JSTOR)

#McCann, Pamela J. Clouser. 2016. *The Federal Design Dilemma*. All.

Week 13 (November 15): State & Local I

*Berry, Christopher. 2008. "Piling on: Multilevel Government and the Fiscal Common-Pool." *American Journal of Political Science* 52(4): 802-20. (JSTOR)

*Gerber, Elisabeth R., and Daniel Hopkins. 2011. "When Mayors Matter: Estimating the Impact of Mayoral Partisanship on City Policy." *American Journal of Political Science* 55(2): 326-39. (JSTOR)

*Anzia, Sarah F., and Molly C. Jackman. 2013. "Legislative Organization and the Second Face of Power: Evidence from U.S. State Legislatures." *Journal of Politics* 75(1): 210-24. (JSTOR)

*Boehmke, Frederick J., Tracy L. Osborne, and Emily U. Schilling. 2015. "Pivotal Politics and Initiative Use in the American States" *Political Research Quarterly* 68(4): 665-77. (JSTOR)

*Caughey, Devin, Yiqing Xu, and Christopher Warshaw. 2017. "Incremental Democracy: The Policy Effects of Partisan Control of State Government." *Journal of Politics* 79(4): 1342-1358. (JOP website)

#Goldstein, Rebecca and Hye Young You. 2017. "Cities as Lobbyists." *American Journal of Political Science* 61(4): 864-876. (AJPS website)

#Tausanovitch, Chris, and Christopher Warshaw. 2014. "Representation in Municipal Government." *American Political Science Review* 108(3): 605-41. (JSTOR)

Week 14 (November 22): Thanksgiving

No Class

Week 15 (November 29): State & Local II

*Anzia, Sarah. 2014. *Timing and Turnout*. All.

*Kogan, Vladimir, Stephane Lavertu, and Zachary Peskowitz. 2018. "Election Timing, Electoral Composition, and Policy Outcomes: Evidence from School Districts." *American Journal of Political Science* 62(3): 637-51. (AJPS website)

*de Benedictis-Kessner, Justin. 2018. "Off-Cycle and Out of Office: Election Timing and the Incumbency Advantage." *Journal of Politics* 80(1): 119-32. (JOP website)

#Alt, James, Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, and Shanna Rose. 2011. "Disentangling Accountability and Competence in Elections: Evidence from U.S. Term Limits." *Journal of Politics* 73: 171-186. (JSTOR)

#Huber, Gregory A., and Sanford C. Gordon. 2004. "Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice Blind when It Runs for Office?" *American Journal of Political Science* 48(2): 247-63. (JSTOR)